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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

ORDER

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 900316-CA

v.
Doty Lyn Brown,
Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of Alan K.
Jeppesen to withdraw as counsel for appellant, filed 2 7 Setpember
1990.
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is
deferred until the Court has had the opportunity to determine
whether the case is wholly frivolous.

Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).
Dated this
BY THE COURT:

/7

day of October, 1990.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether it was plain error for the Court to have allowed the

defendant to withdraw his motion to suppress the testimony of John O'Neil,
ballistic's expert with Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
2.

Whether Defendant would have been denied a speedy trial if the

trial had been continued while the State proceeded with its interlocutory appeal
of the Court's granting of Defendant's Motion to Suppress the testimony of John
O'Neil
3.

Whether the Court erred in admitting the transcript and audio

taped interview of the defendant when the officers did not record a recitation
of defendant's rights under Miranda.
4.

Whether defendant's statements during the interview with the

Tooele County Sheriffs Office were voluntary.
5.

Whether the defendant's claim subsequent to trial of physical abuse

prior to the taped interview was an exceptional circumstance warranting review
by this Court.
6.

Whether a mistrial should have been declared when several women

jurors were in the rest room at the same time a spectator spoke to the
defendant's mother about the victim's death.
7.

Whether the defendant was permitted an impartial jury of his peers

when many of the jurors knew the prosecutor or some of the Tooele County
Sheriff Deputies.
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8.

Whether the Court erred in denying the defendant's Motion to

Dismiss, made at the conclusion of the State's case in chief.
9.

Whether the Court erred in prohibiting Defendant's witness, Mark

McDougal, to testify as to the effect of a 41 caliber bullet shot into the head of
a human at close range.
10.

Whether the Court erred in admitting a cumulative photograph of

the victim's corpse over Defendant's objection.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the conviction of defendant on March 12, 1990, in
the Third District Court in and for Tooele County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno, district judge, presiding. Defendant was tried by a jury, who
found him guilty of Second Degree Murder, a first degree felony in the death
of his wife, Sandra Brown, in violation of Section 76-5-203 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended. The date of Judgment, Conviction and Sentence
was March 12, 1990. Defendant's trial counsel moved to withdraw that same
date, after first filing a Notice of Appeal. Present counsel was appointed to
represent the Defendant for the purposes of his Appeal by an Order entered on
May 29, 1990.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The defendant and Sandra McClellan were married on May 7, 1988.
They resided in Weber and Davis County most of their married life. About

2
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December 3, 1988, defendant left home1. On December 10, 1988, the victim's
daughter2 and a family friend3 drove the victim to the Salt Lake airport so that
she could take a flight to Denver4 to meet her husband. That was the last time
any of her family or friends saw her alive. (T. Vol. VI, p. 109, lines 18-19).
On December 24, 1988, the defendant left a note on his parent's automobile
while they v/ere visiting their daughter, Lisa Stapley, who was also the
defendant's sister, to the effect that Sandra had "taken a bullet meant for me"
and he had lost the only person he loved (T. Vol. IV, pp.199, 201, lines 1-2).
Upon going to their car to leave, his parents discovered the note, went back in
the house to read it, and gave the note to Stan Jones, a detective with the
Riverside, California police department,5 who was visiting Lisa for the holidays.
After Defendant's parents left for home, Defendant came to Lisa's door
and was invited in. Stan Jones, believing that Defendant's note was strange, and
may have involved a murder, sat in the back of the living room out of the
lighted portion of the room6 and listened to the defendant as he talked to his
sister. He appeared to be depressed, but would on occasion become agitated
and would get up from the kitchen table where he and Lisa were sitting and

Ernie Erickson's cross examination, Tr. Vol IV., pp. 112-113.
2
Nikki McCleltan, who was 17 at the time of the incident and had been living with Sandra and Doty (Tr. Vol.
V, pp. 205, 208).
3
Ernie Erickson, who had been defendant's friend since grade school. (Tr. Vol. VI., p. 110-111).
4

Tr. Vol V, pp. 206, 208, line 15.

5

Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 124-125.

6

Tr., Vol. V, p. 158-159.
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walk around the room talking in an agitated manner (Tr., Vol. V, pp. 161, 185,
lines 20-25; 186). At one point Defendant asked for a drink and got up to get
a beer from the refrigerator. When he did so, he removed a revolver from his
pants and placed it on the kitchen table (Tr. Vol. V, p. 162). Stan Jones went
to the table and took the pistol while defendant was getting the beer from the
refrigerator and retreated to his hiding place. When the Defendant discovered
the pistol missing, he became angry. Stan identified himself and told him he
had the pistol and would return it to the Defendant when he left the residence.
An argument ensued and it was settled by Stan putting the pistol in Defendant's
pickup truck and defendant locking the doors. While going to the Truck, Stan
removed five unfired shells from the gun (Tr. Vol. V, pp. 166, lines 19-23; pp.
170-171; Exhibit 42). They were 41 magnum caliber bullets (Tr. Vol. V, p.
163,).
After leaving Lisa's home, defendant went to his parent's home in Ogden.
His mother testified that it was understood that Sandra was dead, and that the
defendant was depressed because of it, but the family did not talk about the
incident in any detail, (Tr. Vol. VI, p. 127) except to understand that Sandra
and Doty had been ambushed by someone in Southern Utah , and Sandra had
been shot by mistake when the people had tried to shoot the defendant (Tr.
Vol. IV, p.201).
On Saturday, March 24, 1989, a group of fathers and their sons were
rabbit hunting on the West side of Johnson's Pass in Tooele County, when two
of the teenage boys saw, what they thought to be a discarded mattress. They
discovered, upon closer observation, that the object was a corpse (Tr., Vol. Ill,
4
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p. 187). The Tooele County Sheriffs Office was called to investigate, and the
Sheriff called the State Medical Examiner's office to assist. During the course
of the investigation, fragments of three bullets were found. One, Exhibit 18, was
found within the victim's skull7 (Tr. Vol III, p. 244-246; Vol IV, pp. 120, 144).
) and two were found under the body in the dirt (Exhibits 17 and 19; Tr. Vol.
Ill, pp. 241-243; Vol IV, p. 121-124).

During the investigation, it was also

discovered that the Defendant had purchased a Smith and Wesson Model 57
41 magnum caliber pistol (Tr. Vol III, p. 255; Vol IV, p. 159) from Galleson's
on December 6, 1988 (Tr. Vol IV, p. 158) in his own name. He sold the same
revolver to Pahl's Pawn Shop on January 27, 1989 (Tr. Vol IV, p. 177-182).
Defendant through his attorney admitted to the same at trial (Tr. Vol V, p.
202).
The pistol was recovered from Pahl's Pawn Shop and delivered with the
bullet fragments to the State Crime Lab (Tr. Vol V, p. 28). Robert Brinkman,
the bureau chief of the State Crime Lab, (Tr. Vol V, p. 22, lines 15-17)
compared the three fragments to two bullets he test fired from the firearm. In
his opinion, the bullet found in the dirt under the victim's head, Exhibit 19, was
fired by the defendant's pistol, (Tr. Vol. V, p. 103; Vol IV, p. 143), and the
fragment found in her head, Exhibit 18, (Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 56, 144), was also
consistent with having been fired from the defendant's revolver, but he could not
say with scientific assurance that the other fragment found in the dirt under the
victim's body was fired from that gun. (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 57, lines 7-9).

7
The Defendant stipulated that the victim found was his wife, Sandra Brown (Tr. Vol IV, p. 168, lines 18-24).
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The State called a second ballistic's expert, Mr. John O'Neil, an employee
of the U. S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 110).
Prior to the commencement of trial, the Defendant had filed and argued a
motion to suppress the testimony of Mr. O'Neil on the grounds that the State
had not complied with the discovery requests of the Defendant, by failing to
timely inform the Defendant that Mr. O'Neil was going to be a witness or the
nature of his testimony (Tr. Vol I, p. 8). After lengthy argument, the Court
granted the defendant's motion to suppress (Tr. Vol I, p. 18), whereupon the
State filed an interlocutory appeal and obtained a restraining order from the
Supreme Court prohibiting the continuance of the trial until the interlocutory
appeal was heard (Tr. Vol. II, p. 38).

The defendant, then sought to be

released on bail (Tr. Vol. II, p. 56, lines 16-19). The Court fashioned a bail of
$30,000 based upon a property bond of $60,000 with the proviso that the same
bond could be used by the defendant on other charges pending in two other
courts (Tr. Vol II, p. 62, lines 2-10; p. 63, lines 20-25 and p. 64, line 1). The
Defendant's counsel asked for a short recess to discuss the matter with his client
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 67, lines 21-25), and upon returning, informed the Court that the
defendant could not meet the bail requirements and did not want to wait in jail
while the trial was suspended by the interlocutory appeal, and was therefore
withdrawing his Motion to Suppress8 (Tr. Vol II, p. 68, lines 19-25; p. 69, lines

"MR. GOTAY: Yes, Your Honor. For the record, let it be known that my client, Doty Brown, was present
during discussions of the issues before the court, and we took a recess so that I could discuss the matter with my client,
so that he had a better understanding of the repercussions and options left to him. And after considerable debate, my
client has decided that he would, he's requested that I withdraw my motion to suppress the ballistics expert that the state
wants to include, . . . with the caveat that he's doing so because he values more a speedy trial than postponing this
matter for an additional sixty or ninety [days]."

6
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1-7).

Mr. O'Neil testified that based upon his education, training and

experience, as well as his examination of the defendant's firearm, Exhibit 26, the
three bullet fragments, Exhibits 17-19, the two bullets which had been fired by
Robert Brinkman from the defendant's gun, Exhibit 41, (Tr. Vol V, p. 29, lines
14-22) and two bullets he fired from the defendant's gun, (Tr. Vol. V, p. 119,
lines 1-17), that without any doubt the three fragments, Exhibits 17-19 were fired
from the defendant's gun and from no other (Tr. Vol. V, p. 123, lines 14-15; p.
125, line 25 and p. 126, lines 1-7; p. 127, lines 11-17; p. 128, lines 22-25 and p.
129, lines 1-12). He also testified that it was easier to identify Exhibit 18, the
fragment taken from the head of the victim, after soaking and washing the blood
and tissue out of the scire on the fragment (Tr. Vol. V, p. 126, lines 17-25).
While the defendant's counsel carefully and expertly cross examined each of the
State's witnesses, in great detail, all of the above testimony came into evidence
without objection.
Rudy Reit, an investigator on the Staff of the State Medical Examiner's
Office (Tr. Vol IV, p. 63, lines 5-8) testified that the victim had been shot at
the scene where the body was found (Tr. Vol IV, p. 70, lines 19-22).

Dr.

Edward Leis, who was a fellow in training in forensic pathology with the Utah
State Medical Examiner at the time of his autopsy of the victim's body (Tr. Vol
IV, p. 97, lines 21-22)9, testified that he performed the autopsy on the victim's
body (Tr. Vol IV., p. 100, lines 2-20). He found that a bullet had gone through
the hood of the victim's sweater which was bunched up behind her head, without
9

Defendant stipulated to his qualifications as an expert in the area of forensic pathology (Tr. Vol VI., p. 99, lines

2-4).
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striking her body (Tr. Vol IV., p. 104, lines 2-13). He also observed a gun shot
entrance wound on the left side of the victim's nose (Tr. Vol IV., p. 105, lines
7-15). There was evidence of gun powder within the wound which led him to
believe that the weapon had been at close range, about an inch or closer when
fired (Tr. Vol IV., p. 107, lines 2-19). He testified that in his scientific opinion
the victim died of a gun shot wound to the head, and that there was only one
wound to her body (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 116, lines 14-25, p. 117, lines 1-3). All of
this evidence came in without objection.

SUMMARY OF DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT
This is a case involving circumstances only. There is no direct evidence
placing Defendant at the scene of the victim's body, and there was no motive
for the crime (Tr. Vol III, p. 168, line 21). The uncontroverted evidence was
that the Defendant loved his wife, and was always mindful of her well being (Tr.
Vol VI., p. 130, lines 5-12; p. 106, lines 24-25, p. 107, lines 1-6; p. 91, lines 28). The Defendant was not a violent person, and there is no evidence that he
was had a explosive temper or was cruel (Tr. Vol VI, p. 131-132, lines 1-10).
From the commencement of the case, when the Defendant was first interviewed
by the two deputies from Tooele County, he maintained that he did not kill his
wife, but that she was killed in an ambush by government agents (Vol III, p.
178, lines 21-23; Vol VI, p. 100, lines 11-15; p. 118, lines 15-25, p. 119, lines 12; p. 127, lines 8-13; Exhibit 2; Vol VI, p. 40, lines 17-25; p. 72, lines 2-22).
There was also abundant, uncontroverted testimony by those who knew Doty
best that he and Sandra had been afraid of someone pursuing them for several
8
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weeks before Sandra flew to Denver to meet her husband (Vol. VI, p. 94, lines
20-25, p. 95, lines 1-24; p. 107, lines 7-16; p 138, lines 2-18). Hence, Defendant
established a reasonable explanation for the criminal death of his wife which was
not refuted by the State. Lastly, Defendant had maintained from the first time
he was examined by the investigators that he had taken Sandra's body to a
remote spot by Nephi, and that she had not died at the spot where her body
was found by the hunters (Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 181, lines 3-5; Vol. VI, p. 29, lines 914; p. 40, lines 12-25).

Uncontroverted evidence existed to support the

defendant's position: The sun glasses which were worn by the victim had a lens
missing (Tr. Vol IV, p. 65, lines 13-23). That lens was found some 73 feet from
her body (Tr. Vol VI., p. 155, lines 10-24). The victim's clothes, including her
white boots, did not have any mud or debris which would indicate that she had
walked to the site where her corpse was found (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 90, lines 16-25,
p. 91, lines 1-13). Finally, there was no evidence of lividity10 present in the
body (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 80, lines 3-6).

The absence of lividity supported

defendant's contention that the victim had been killed elsewhere and brought to
the spot where her corpse was found (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 82, lines 3-9). Hence, the
defendant provided sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt.
Without the evidence of John O'Neil from the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, the State would have had weak evidence that the bullet

Lividity or Liver Mortis, as defined by the witness, Rudy, Reit of the Medical Examiner's Office is the effect
of gravity pooling the body fluids at the lowest point of the body after death, causing a darkening of that area of the
corpse. (Tr. Vol IV, p. 93, lines 4-25, p. 94, lines 1-7).
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fragments found in the victim's head and under her body came from the
defendant's gun. Robert Brinkman, the ballistic's expert with the Utah State
Crime Lab was not as convincing or precise in his testimony about the reliability
of his opinion on those issues (Tr. Vol. V, p. 51, lines 21-25, p. 52, lines 1-9; p.
53, lines 2-11; p. 56, lines 3-21; p. 57, lines 1-16; p. 77, lines 11-22). The Court
committed plain error to allow the Defendant to withdraw his Motion to
Suppress after it was already granted.

State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah,

1985) and State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah, 1985), citing State v. McCardelU
652 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah, 1982).11 The period of time the defendant would have
had to wait for the resumption of the trial would have allowed his counsel to
prepare to meet Mr. O'Neil's testimony if the Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's granting of the Motion to Suppress, and the time period in jail would
have been insignificant compared to the prison sentence upon a conviction based
upon that testimony.
While the proper remedy for the tardiness of the discovery revelations of
Mr. O'Neil's testimony was suppression, the Supreme Court erred in staying the
trial proceedings while the interlocutory appeal was pending. To stay the trial
proceedings, denied defendant his right to a speedy trial under the constitution.
Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, governs the granting of stays on
appeals filed by the State.12 There simply was no good cause to grant a stay in

Court's ruling will be reversed if the trial court so abused its discretion as to create a likelihood that injustice
resulted. Said considerations should include constitutional rights of the accused.
12

Rule 8 (c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: "Stays in criminal cases pending appeal are governed by Section
77-35-27 Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended (Rule 27, U. R. Crim. P.)." Rule 27 (a) (3), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure: "When an appeal is taken by the state, a stay of any order or judgment in favor of the defendant may be
granted by the court upon good cause pending disposition of the appeal."

10
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this instance, and the stay, being granted without a hearing, deprived the
defendant of the opportunity to be heard on the issue before the effect of the
stay adversely affected him.13 Hence, he was forced, by the Supreme Court's
error to give away his valuable right to suppress Mr. O'Neil's testimony and in
effect was convicted as a consequence.14
Shortly after his arrest, the two Tooele County deputy sheriffs assigned to
investigate the death of Sandra Brown questioned Defendant in the Salt Lake
County Jail. As indicated by defendant's affidavit attached to this brief and by
this reference made a part hereof, the defendant was physically assaulted and
abused by the officers prior to the audio tape recording being commenced. He
was never explained his rights to counsel or not to speak to the officers, and the
tape recording contains no such admonitions. Yet, the Court allowed the taped
interview to be introduced into evidence and given to the jury as Exhibits 48
and 49 (Tr. Vol VI, p. 23-25).

The defendant was prejudiced by the

introduction of this examination, because he had not been able to speak with an
attorney before the recording was made. Had he been able to speak with an
attorney, he may not have told the officers about the ambush in Southern Utah,
the accidental killing of his wife by the government agents, and his subsequent
burial of her body in an area he understood to be in Utah County.

He

understands that the story is not plausible, and may not have come forth were

Good cause means a substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse. State v. Estencion, 625 P.2d 1040, 1042
(Haw., 1981).
14
For good cause to exist for stay of court proceedings, there must be a showing that the appeal will interfere
with and prejudice the criminal prosecution. U. S. V. One Single Family Residence, 710 F. Supp. 1351, 1352 (S.D. Fla.).
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his constitutional rights protected, and had the Court not erred in allowing the
transcript and testimony concerning it to be introduced at trial, State v. Martinez,
595 P.2d 897 (Utah, 1979); State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440 (Utah, 1986).15
During the course of the trial, several of the female jurors were in the
women's rest room at the Court house during a recess when a Mrs. Walker, a
spectator of the trial began questioning defendant's mother about the victim's
death. While the Court interrogated all of the women jurors about the incident,
and only one stated she had heard anything at all, and she said she could not
really understand what was being said, (Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 34-39) to avoid the taint
of impropriety, the Court should have declared a mistrial and called a new jury
to hear the matter, Putro v. Baker, 410 P.2d 717 (Mont., 1966)16
The defendant was granted many of his challenges of prospective jurors
for cause, (Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 71, 83, 88, 109) he was denied his challenge of two
members of the panel, Messrs. Nix and Downey (Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 115, 89). Mr.
Nix knew Alan James, the State's chief criminal investigator, several other police
or sheriffs deputies, (Tr. Vol., Ill, p. I l l ) he grew up in the same neighborhood
as the county attorney who tried the case, and knew him in school (Tr. Vol III,
p. 113). Mr. Evensen knew several of the deputy sheriffs, including Alan James.
He called them by their first names (Tr. Vol. III., pp. 86-89). Defendant should
have been allowed a panel of prospective jurors who had no personal
acquaintanceship with any of the witnesses, parties or their counsel, Goff v.
15
But see Fjeldsted v. Cox, 611 P.2d 382 (Utah, 1980), Miranda rights only have to be explained when the
statements are inculpatory, not when they are exculpatory.
An improper jury influence which has a natural tendency to prejudice the verdict is grounds for a mistrial.

12
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Kinzle, 411 P.2d 105 (Mont., 1966) and Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines,
Co., 503 P.2d 850 (Utah, 1972).17
At the conclusion of the State's case, the defendant moved to dismiss (Tr.
Vol. 84), arguing that this case is not significantly different from State v. Petri,
659 P.2d 443 (Utah, 1983).
probably the defendant.

The last person to have seen the victim was

There was no direct evidence, however linking her

death to the defendant or placing him at the scene of her death. Just as in the
Petri case, there was not enough evidence to convict the defendant. The State
had failed to carry its burden of proof, and hence, he should be acquitted and
the case dismissed. The Court erred when it failed to grant that motion, or at
least reduce the charge.
Defendant did not have the funds with which to obtain more than one
expert witness to counter the testimony of the State's witnesses, including the
medical examiner, medical examiner's investigator, and the two ballistics experts.
However, he did call one witness, a person who had possessed federal firearms
license for six years, had a bachelor's degree from Brigham Young University
and a Juris Doctor degree from the University of Puget Sound, who had been
a deputy county attorney in Thurston County, State of Washington in the major
felony division for one year and worked on six homicide cases. He had also
clerked for the Superior Court and was familiar with several homicide cases
involving firearms.

He was then a City Prosecutor for a City Attorney, and

handled many firearms cases (Tr. Vol. VI, p. 144-145). The defendant intended
17
Improper conduct charged to one juror is chargeable to the entire panel, and the finder of fact may not go
outside the evidence in reaching a verdict.

13
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to offer his testimony as to the powder marks, etc., that would have been found
upon the victim's face had she been shot as the State's witnesses had testified
(Tr. Vol. VI, p. 147, lines 20-25, p. 148, lines 1-3 and 12-14). The Court would
not accept the witness as an expert, thereby depriving the defendant of his only
expert testimony to rebut the experts who testified for the State. The Court
should have permitted the witness to testify out of the presence of the Jury to
first determine exactly what the witnesses qualifications were, before denying the
witness the right to be examined before the Jury, and disqualifying him only on
the arguments of counsel (Tr. Vol VI, pp. 184, line 16 through p. 152, line 22).
If the proper foundation had been laid, including the expertise of the witness,
his degree of familiarity with the necessary facts, and the logical nexus between
his opinion and the facts adduced, his opinion would
Edward v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah).

14

have been admissible.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is the defendant's position that an accumulation of errors
convicted him. Had John O'Neil not testified, had his examination at the Jail
not been introduced, had his expert not been excluded, had a truly impartial jury
panel been selected, had the court granted his motion to dismiss been granted,
he would have been acquitted.

The accumulation of these errors led to an

unfair and prejudicial trial, and his conviction should be reversed and he should
be released from incarceration.
Finally, after a thorough and conscientious examination of the record,
counsel for Defendant has concluded that the appeal of this matter is wholly
without merit, and pursuant to the provisions of State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168
(1981), counsel has prepared this brief raising all issues which could arguably be
brought for Defendant. Counsel has informed Defendant that should he wish
to address the Court on the issues raised or such other issues as he may decide
have merit, that he would be given an opportunity to do so, but that counsel
would move the Court to permit his withdrawal from the case. Defendant has
requested that counsel move the Court to grant him an additional sixty (60) days
within which to prepare his own brief on appeal, and counsel has prepared a
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separate motion to that effect
contemporaneously with this brief

and submits the same to the court

18

Respectfully submitted,

Alan K. Jeppeser
Attorney lor Defendant

>4AsA^^<

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused four copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to be mailed, postage prepaid this

*2«£T day of September, 1990,

to Paul R. VanDam, Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capital, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84114, and Doty Lyn Brown, Defendant, P. O. Box 250, Draper, Utah

84020.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and
Appellee,
Case No. 900316-CA

vs.
DOTY LYN BROWN,
Defendant and
Appellant.

DEFENDANTS AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF UTAH )
: ss.
County of Tooele )
Doty Lyn Brown, being first duly sworn, deposes and states upon his oath
as follows:
1.

He is the defendant and appellant in this cause of action, and is

personally knowledgable of the facts and circumstances herein related.
2.

That after his arrest by Sergeants James and Bradshaw of the

Tooele County Sheriffs Office, he was taken to a small room in the Salt Lake
County Jail.
3.

Affiant's hands were handcuffed behind his back.

4.

Sergeants James and Bradshaw came into the room and without

introduction, began to question affiant about his wife's death.
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5.

Affiant told the two men that he wanted to talk to an attorney

before he said anything to them.
6.

Sergeant James told affiant, well, we can do this the easy way or

we can do it the hard way.
7.

Affiant asked him what he meant, and Sergeant James said, you

can tell us how it happened or we can do it the hard way, and you will tell us
what happened.
8.

Affiant told the men, that he didn't have anything to say to them

until he got an attorney.
9.

Sergeant James then picked affiant up by his arms, which were

handcuffed behind affiant's back, and as he did so, Sergeant Bradshaw slammed
affiant's face into the top of the steel table at which affiant had been seated.
10.

Bradshaw then said, that is what we mean by the hard way, and

left the room.
11.

All during this time the tape recorder which the officers used to

record the examination of affiant was on and running.
12.

After Sergeant Bradshaw left the room, Sergeant James asked

affiant if he was ready to talk. When affiant said no, Mr. James knocked his
head into the top of the table again, and again.
13.

Once in a while Sergeant James would leave the room and

Sergeant Bradshaw would come in and try to talk affiant into confessing, and
when affiant said he had nothing of which he should confess, he would leave the
room and Sergeant James would come back in and hit affiant again.
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14.

This abusive conduct continued for a long time. Affiant believes

it was between fortey five minutes and an hour and one-half.
15.

Finally, when no one else appeared to come to affiant's aid, affiant

decided he had better talk to the officers without his attorney or he would be
really, seriously hurt, and he commenced to tell them what he knew about his
wife's death.
16.

When the officers finally disclosed that they were from the Tooele

County Sheriffs Office, affiant was very surprised, because affiant's wife and
affiant had not had any contact with Tooele County prior to affiant's wife's
death or thereafter.
17.

The officers told affiant that his wife's body had been discovered

in Tooele County.
18.

Affiant did not leave his wife's body in Tooele County, and does

not know how it came to be placed there.
19.

Further affiant sayeth naught.

Dated this

Z^S^

day of September 21, 1990.

Joty Lyn Bro/m, Affiant
Defendant and Appellant
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On the 2.£Z day of September 4pj; 1990, personally appeared before me
Doty Lyn Brown, a person known to me, the signer of the foregoing affidavit,
who acknowledged before me that he signed the same.

Residing in Tooele/County, Utah
My commission expiresfS^

NWI*7

nit
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